Universidade de Braília


Palestra de David Chaum na UnB

TÍTULO DA PALESTRA Secret-Ballot receipt and transparent integrity
DATA E HORA Sexta-feira, 18 de Julho de 2003, às 16 horas
LOCAL Auditório Dois Candangos (antiga reitoria)
Inventor de protocolos de moeda eletrônica, detentor de várias patentes em segurança computacional, um dos mais importantes criptógrafos em atividade, David Chaum estará em Brasíla em 18/07, onde proferirá palestra sobre sua recente proposta para votação eletrônica. O processo emite recibo que permite ao eleitor conferir a integridade do seu voto até à apuração, sem entretanto permitir-lhe provar a terceiros as suas escolhas, e portanto, ofercendo integridade sem comprometimento do sigilo do voto.

A palestra será em inglês. Seguido à palestra, pergutas e respostas. 
O auditório Dois Candangos comporta 249 pessoas.
Não será cobrado ingresso. 

Devido à relevância e interesse no tema, o público terá acesso 
ao auditório por ordem de chegada, até a sua lotação. Portanto, 
o fato da entrada ser franca não implica em garantia de acesso.

Mais informações com o prof. Pedro A. D. Rezende, rezende@cic.unb.br

Resumo da paletra:

      Receipts showing exactly who you voted for -- just what is generally wanted and expected today -- have been outlawed to prevent vote selling and  other abuses. A new kind of receipt cannot be abused. It also lets you be sure that your votes are correctly included in the final tally, even if all the computers used to run the election are compromised!

       Receipts are printed on two-layer media by a modified version of familiar receipt printers. You can read them clearly in the booth; but before leaving, you must separate the layers and choose which one to keep.
Either one you take has coded in it the vote information you saw, though your choices can now only be read using keys divided among computers run by election officials.

      The layer you take is supplied by the voting machine for publication on an official election website, where you can verify that it is posted.

       After deriving the tally from the posted receipts, a lotto-like draw selects parts that must be decrypted for inspection, but not so many parts that privacy is compromised. Anyone with a computer can simply check all the decryptions, which should also be published on the website, and thereby verify that the final tally must be correct.

       The printers and media are practical and under development. The overall system cost is lower than with today's voting machines and the hardware can additionally be used for other purposes year round. Current election system functionality, including write-ins and provisional ballots, is fully supported and can be extended significantly. A variety of public policy issues are raised. (See www.vreceipt.com.)

O autor, pelo autor:

Widely recognized as the inventor of electronic cash, David is also known among cryptographers and security experts as the inventor of many basic cryptographic techniques, general results, secure electronic voting, and the basic techniques that allow individuals to protect their identity and related information in interactions with organizations.

With Ph.d. from Berkeley, he taught, led a crypto research group, and founded IACR and DigiCash. Currently he is affiliated with several companies,  universities and international projects.

Material da Palestra


1- Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms  By David Chaum
     Communications of the ACM February 1981 Volume 24 Number 2

2- Secret-Ballot receipt and transparent integrity, by David Chaum
    12 page article, pdf format